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SCHOOL FINANCE ADEQUACY AS
VERTICAL EQUITY
Julie K. Underwood*
In this Article, Dean Underwood explains that school finance cases
can be divided into three waves of reform. The first wave involved
efforts to use the Federal Equal Protection Clause to overturn financing systems. Litigants in the second wave turned to state equal
protection and due process clauses. Finally, the third wave involved
the utilization of education clauses in state constitutions as the
predominant litigation vehicle. These three waves embody two
primary approaches to school finance litigation. The first approach
involves a challenge to the adequacy of a state's funding system
under either the state or federal equal protection clause, the primary
focus being equality in spending among districts. The second approach, which was used in school finance litigation during the third
wave, is based on the education clauses in state constitutions. The
argument in such a case is that the legislature has not fulfilled its
obligation to provide an education. The theme in cases using the state
education clause is adequacy from the perspective of"vertical equity,"
meaning that different students should be treated differently based
on their special educational needs. More recent school finance cases
have concentrated on this second approach and thus have shifted the
focus from equal resources to an adequate education for all students.
Dean Underwood concludes, however, that this approach still focuses
on education inputs rather than on desired educational outcomes.

INTRODUCTION

Although the funding balances among federal, state, and local
sources have shifted over the last thirty years, 1 few would argue
that education has become a lower social priority. 2 For any
*
Professor and Dean, School of Education, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. B.A.
1976, DePauw University; J.D. 1979, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington;
Ph.D. 1984, University of Florida.
1.
By the end of the 1950s, the federal share of educational expenditures for the
nation's elementary and secondary schools was 4.4% and the local share of expenditures
was 56.5%. By the end of the 1970s, the federal share was 9.8% and the local share was
43.4%. THOMAS D. SNYDER & CHARLENE M. HOFFMAN, NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 50 (1994).
2.
Federal support for education was estimated at $87.6 billion in 1994, an increase of 123% since 1980. After adjustment for inflation, this represents a 22%
increase during this time. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR
EDUCATION 7 tbl. 39 (1994).
493

494

University of Michigan Journal of Law 'Reform

[VOL. 28:3

society, education is the most fundamental investment in the
future that can be made. As the United States Supreme Court
stated in 1954:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life ifhe is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms. 3
In the United States, it is generally accepted that statedistributed resources must be distributed equally. 4 This notion
holds true unless there is a legitimate rationale to provide

3.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). This sentiment was reiterated by the Supreme Court in 1982.
The "American people have always regarded education and [the) acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance." We have recognized "the public
schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system
of government," and as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the values on which
our society rests." ... "[S)ome degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens
to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to
preserve freedom and independence." And these historic "perceptions of the public
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social
scientists." In addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals
might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education
has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (citations omitted).
4.
Cf Au.AN R ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. PICUS, ScHOOL FINANCE: A PoLICY l'ERsPECTivE
10 (1992) (describing how states in the early 1920s created "[a]id structures [that)
were designed to distribute larger amounts [of money) to districts with a small
property tax base per pupil and smaller amounts [of money) to districts with a large
property tax base per pupil"); id. at 20 (suggesting that "[d)ifferences in educational
expenditures per pupil across school districts in a state [constituted) the basic school
finance problem [that was) recognized as early as 1905") (citation omitted).
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resources unequally. 5 In school finance, this concept is often
referred to as horizontal equity, 6 in which every individual is
treated the same and all students are considered equivalent.
Equity and fairness should dictate that the state not create
educational inequities with its own hands-through its school
finance mechanisms.
There are three kinds of inequality of educational opportunity: (1) innate, (2) environmental, and (3) state-created. The
first type of inequality is natural and exists because human
beings have varying abilities and capabilities. It is an innate
condition of a child's intelligence, physical strength, disability,
or giftedness. I believe that correction of deficiencies due to
this type of inequality is desirable. This is in keeping with the
widely accepted notion of equity that permits a departure from
strict equality of revenues per pupil if the departure is based
on an educational need. Thus, more can be given to those who
have greater educational needs.
The second kind of educational inequality is created by social
and economic conditions that have not been caused directly by
governmental policy alone, but rather result from individual
or private-sector decisions acting independently or in connection with governmental policy. Many times, such conditions
indirectly influence the education of children, rendering real
deficiencies in capacity to benefit from educational programs. 7
Environmental inequalities are visited particularly upon
children in high-poverty areas, such as poor rural areas and
urban centers, where language deficiencies are great, positive
parental influence is often minimal, crime is rampant, parental
income is low, cultural opportunities are lacking, and stabilizing conditions are at a premium. 8 These two forms of inequality, innate and environmental, bring forth the need for vertical
equity9-the rationale for treating individuals differently in an
attempt to mitigate these inequalities. Vertical equity requires

5.

See infra Part I.A.
6.
For a more complete discussion of horizontal equity in school finance, see
RoBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEAsUREMENT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE:
CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND EMPffiICAL DIMENSIONS 18-26 (1984).
7.
See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
8.
See, e.g., notes 138-39 (describing the situation in urban Milwaukee and surrounding suburbs).
9.
For a more detailed discussion of the concept of vertical equity, see BERNE &
STIEFEL, supra note 6, at 2-3, 35-40.
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differences in resource allocation based on legitimate differences between individuals. 10
The third form of inequality may be caused by the state's
actions or omissions in its statutory provisions for education
funding, usually a combination scheme of state and local taxation. In such cases, the legislature, by combining state and
local tax revenues, creates revenue inequalities and disparate
educational opportunities primarily due to differences in local
fiscal capacity.
School finance equity litigation traditionally focuses on the
last of these three types of inequalities-the argument being
that the state must rectify the inequalities caused by its own
creation. 11 Educational benefits should not be a function of district wealth. Instead, the allocation of state resources should
be based on a rationale more closely tied to education. In
addition, differences in educational opportunity created by
natural and environmental conditions should be mitigated to
the greatest extent possible to alleviate the debilitating conditions visited upon the least advantaged.
An additional principle useful to a discussion relating to
school finance is efficiency or effectiveness, referred to sometimes as accountability standards. Efficiency is an older
phrase, often defined as a ratio of outputs to inputs: "Efficiency
is increased by increasing desired outcomes secured from available resources or by maintaining a given level of outcomes
while using fewer resources." 12 Effectiveness deals with the
degree to which resources are allocated in ways shown to be
effective through research:
The effectiveness principle shifts the perspective to whether or not resources are deployed in research-proven
effective ways. The effectiveness principle suggests that a
resource inequity exists not only when insufficient resources are available, but when resources are not used in ways
that produce desired impacts on student performance. 13

10.
11.

See id.
See infra Part I.A-B.

12.
AUSI'IN SWANSON & RICHARD KING, SCHOOL FINANCE: ITS EcoNOMICS AND PoLITICS
24 (1991).
13.
ODDEN & Plcus, supra note 4, at 52.
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Consider the following example. The state is mandated by
statute to provide a coat for every child to keep that child safe
from the winter's cold. Clearly, if the state gives coats only to
those children whose parents reside in certain parts of the
state, its obligation is not met. Additionally, if the state gives
the same size coat to every child, the statute's purpose is not
served. Although the state originally fulfills the statute's terms
on its face, the large child does not have a coat sufficient to
keep him warm and the small child has a coat too large to suit
his needs, wasting resources. More specifically, the large
child's needs are not met adequately and the small child's
needs are not met efficiently. Only when the state provides a
coat suitable to each child's needs does the state meet its
obligation both adequately and efficiently. Thus, the question
within school finance is whether the state financing structure
supports the public schools in such a manner as to impose
educational disadvantage on certain children of the state while
bestowing unique educational privileges on others.

I. SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION

Generally, there are two approaches to litigating school
finance equity cases. The first theory involves the constitutional doctrine of equal protection. 14 As encompassed by either the
federal or state constitution, this doctrine prohibits the government from treating similarly situated individuals differently
without a strong justification. 15 In one variation of this theory,
litigants argue that the state practice of inequitable funding
unjustifiably treats students who reside in poorer districts
differently from those students who reside in more affluent
districts. 16 The second variation of the equal protection theory
asserts that the lower funding level in poorer districts results
in a deprivation of education to students who reside in these

14. See infra notes 20-40 and accompanying text; Part 1.A-B.
15. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 14.1, at 523 (3d ed. 1986)
(stating that "[t)he fourteenth amendment commands that no person shall be denied
equal protection of the law" and that "[t]he equal protection guarantee ... governs all
governmental actions") (emphasis added).
16. See infra Part I.A.
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districts. 17 Thus, the first variation focuses on differential
treatment while the second focuses on inadequacy.
The second type oflitigation theory, based exclusively on the
education clause in a state constitution, contends that a state
legislature has failed to live up to its state constitutional obligation to provide an education to the children in its state. 18
Scholars have divided the school finance cases into three
separate "waves" of reform. 19 Each wave has its own identifiable characteristics and differs in terms of venue and litigation theory. The first wave starts with the inception of school
finance equity cases and closes with the 1973 Supreme Court
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 20 These cases focused on the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution. 21 Initial efforts to use the
Federal Equal Protection Clause to overturn financing systems met with little success. 22 The failure of these attempts
led to the development of a legal theory by Coons, Clune, and
Sugarman. 23 They argued that the level of spending for a
child's education should not be a function of local district
property wealth. 24 This strategy was successfully employed in
Serrano v. Priest 25 in 1971. This case marked the first time

17. See infra Part l.B.
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. See PAULE. BARTON ET AL., POLICY INFO. Om., THE STATE OF INEQUALITY (1991)
(describing the degrees of inequality in the education system and the movement to
provide greater equity); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of
School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV.
597, 598 (1994) [hereinafter Thro, Judicial Analysis) (exploring the methodology of
judicial decision making during the third wave of school finance cases); William E.
Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on
the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 222 (1990)
[hereinafter Thro, Third Wave) (analyzing changes in public school finance reform
litigation that signified the inception of the third wave); Julie K Underwood &
William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL 'V 517 (1991) (discussing litigation theories used in cases occurring
during the third wave).
20.
411 U.S. 1 (1973); see Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 19, 600-01; Thro,
Third Wave, supra note 19, at 222-251. Cases leading up to Rodriguez included
Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241
(Cal. 1971), and Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd, 394 U.S.
322 (1969).
21.
The Equal Protection Clause states: "No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22.
See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 19, at 600-03.
23.
See JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
24.
Id. at 2.
25.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
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that a state system of school finance was found unconstitutional. 26 In Serrano, the California Supreme Court found that
the state funding system violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. 27 This case
spawned debate in the area of school finance, 28 the focus of
which was achieving equal resources for each child in the
system.
This wave was cut short when, in Rodriguez, 29 the Supreme
Court effectively precluded litigants from using the Federal
Equal Protection Clause as a vehicle for school finance reform.
The Court ruled that education was not a fundamental right
because it is not explicitly or implicitly protected by the United
States Constitution. 3 Further, the Court ruled that the Constitution did not prohibit the government from providing different
services to children in poor school districts than it did to children in wealthy school districts. 31 The Court found that,
although the Equal Protection Clause may protect the rights
of poor school children, it "does not require absolute equality
or precisely equal advantages." 32 After this decision, a few decisions in state courts followed the Rodriguez analysis and found
the challenged systems to be constitutional. 33

°

26.
Cf. Eric A Hanushek, A Jaundiced View of "Adequacyn in School Finance
Reform, 8 EDUC. POL'y 460, 464 (1994) (describing how "[t)he modern era of school
finance reform was launched with the landmark Serrano u. Priest ... case in California in the late 1960s"); Thro, Third Waue, supra note 19, at 223-24 (describing how
the California Supreme Court in Serrano I accepted the "fiscal neutrality" theory, the
first time that theory was used in a school finance reform case).
27.
Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1249-52.
28.
See, e.g., NATIONAL CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM: A
LEGISLATORS' HANDBOOK (John J. Callahan & William H. Wilken eds., 1976) (analyzing
school finance reform efforts since 1971); Joel S. Berke & John J. Callahan, Serrano v.
Priest: Milestone or Millstone for School Finance, 21 J. PuB. LAW 23 (1972) (discussing
whether Serrano I and its progeny likely would bring about increased fairness in
educational finance); W. Norton Grubb & Jack W. Osman, The Causes of School
Finance Inequalities: Serrano and the Case of California, 5 PuB. FIN. Q. 373 (1977)
(analyzing Serrano I in the specific context of California in order to determine the
causes of expenditure inequalities).
29.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
30.
Id. at 33-35. The Court's test for fundamentality was as follows:
[T)he key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to
subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as
important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there
is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.

Id. at 33-34.
31.
Id. at 24.
32.
Id. The Court also supplied additional reasons for its decision. See id.
33.
See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592-93 (Ariz. 1973); Northshore Sch.
Dist. No. 417v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 200 (Wash. 1974), overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist.
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The second wave of cases is marked by greater state independence from the United States Supreme Court's precedent
in Rodriguez. In these cases, with the focus remaining the
achievement of equal resources for each child in the system,
state courts employed their respective state constitutional
provisions of either due process or equal protection. The California Supreme Court may have triggered this wave with its
second Serrano 34 decision, where it found that education was
a fundamental right under the California Constitution. 35 There,
the court employed strict scrutiny36 to determine that children
were denied this state constitutional right. 37 The highest courts
of West Virginia38 and Wyoming39 followed this approach. 40
The third and final wave took shape during the last part of
the 1980s and departed significantly from previous cases. First,
this wave is marked by a shift away from traditional horizontal equity arguments of the first two waves and toward a
greater emphasis on student programs and opportunities. 41
This shift may have been due, in part, to the publication of A
Nation At Risk, 42 a report focusing on accountability and
No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71(Wash.1978). BothSlwfstall and Kinnear followed the Rodriguez analysis and found the state funding system constitutional. Although rejecting the
Rodriguez analysis, both Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 646 (Idaho 1975) and
Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 144-45 (Or. 1976) upheld the school finance systems as
constitutional. Thompson, 554 P.2d at 653; Olsen, 537 P.2d at 148-49.
34.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano In, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
907 (1977).
35.
Serrano II, 557 P.2d. at 951.
36.
For a discussion of the three levels of review under the Equal Protection Clause,
see NOWAK ET AL., supra note 15, § 14.3, at 530-33 (3d ed. 1986).
37.
Serrano II, 557 P.2d. at 951-53.
38.
Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 CW. Va. 1979) (holding that education is
a fundamental right guaranteed by the West Virginia Constitution and that "any
discriminatory classification found in the educational financing system" would be
reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard).
39.
Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 340 (Wyo. 1980)
(holding that education is a fundamental interest and that the state's school financing
system was unconstitutional under Wyoming Constitution's equal protection clause),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
40.
For examples of state courts that held that education was not a fundamental
right under the state constitution and that consequently applied rational basis review,
see Lujon v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982), Hornbeck
v. Somerset County Board of Education, 458 A2d 758 (Md. 1983), Board of Education,
Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal
dismissed, Board of Education v. Nyquist, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983), and Board ofEducation
v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
41.
See, e.g., McDuffyv. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,
552 (Mass. 1993).
42.
NATIONAL CoMM'N ON ExCELLENCE IN Enuc., A NATION AT RisK: THE IMPERATIVES
FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983). States reacted to this report by strengthening high school
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efficiency issues that drew national attention away from equal
allocation of resources and toward achievement and outcomes.
Second, the third wave differs from the previous two waves in
that the predominant litigation vehicle used is the education
clause of state constitutions. 43 Finally, a significant change in
this wave is the consistent success plaintiffs have had in overturning state funding systems. Plaintiffs have been successful
in New Jersey, 44 Massachusetts, 45 Alabama, 46 Tennessee, 47
Missouri, 48 Kentucky, 49 Texas, 50 and Montana. 51 But this success is not uniform-plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in

graduation requirements, upgrading curriculum standards and raismg teacher
certification requirements. POLICY INFo. Orn., EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERV., THE STATE OF
INEQUALITY 19 (1991).
43.
See, e.g., McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 517-18 (quoting the Massachusetts educational
clause as it served as the basis for plaintiffs' challenge to that state's educational finance
system).
44. See Abbott v. Burke, 643 A2d 575, 576 (N.J. 1994) (affirming a lower court's
judgment that New Jersey's Quality Education Act was unconstitutional as the act failed
to "assure parity of regular education expenditures between the special needs districts
and the more affluent districts").
45. See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 516 (holding Commonwealth's school financing
system unconstitutional as it failed to provide constitutionally adequate educational
opportunities to both the wealthy and poor students in Massachusetts).
46. See Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117-R
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices
No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. (Ala. 1993) (holding Alabama's school finance system
unconstitutional as it inter alia failed to provide appropriate instruction to children with
disabilities as required by the state constitution).
47.
See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993)
(holding that local control over school administration did not justify state educational
funding system that produced substantial disparities in educational opportunities for
students in various districts).
48.
See Committee for Educ. Equalityv. Missouri, No. CV190-1371CC (Cole County,
Mo. Jan. 15, 1993) (concluding that the Missouri school financing system was unconstitutional under that state's constitution because the system created vast disparities in the
funding of Missouri school districts) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
49.
See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (holding
that the Kentucky common school system violated the state constitution because the
system did not operate efficiently).
50. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist.,
826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) (holding the Texas school financing system unconstitutional
under the Texas Constitution because the system required levying inappropriate taxes);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (concluding that the
state school financing system violated the Texas constitution by failing to operate
efficiently), mandamus proceeding, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
51. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989)
(holding the state educational funding system invalid under the Montana Constitution
because it failed to provide equality of educational opportunity to all students), amended,
784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990).
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overturning the state systems in Kansas, 52 Illinois, 53 Virginia, 54
North Dakota, 55 Minnesota, 56 and Wisconsin. 57

A Differential Treatment
This section examines some cases in which plaintiffs have
argued that treating students from poor districts differently
from students from wealthy districts-by spending less money
per student in poor districts-violates the equal protection
clause of either the state or federal constitution. In two cases
involving school finance equity litigation, the Supreme Court
stated that, under the United States Constitution, the appropriate level of scrutiny is the lowest level, rational basis review. In
San Antonio Independent School District u. Rodriguez, 58 the
Court held that the state system merely had to bear some
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose; 59 and the
disparity in funding was upheld as being a result of the state's
52.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994) (upholding state
school financing system under the Kansas Constitution where the system was applied
uniformly throughout the state, even though such application meant that different
districts received different amounts of money).
53. See Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. App. 1994)
(upholding the state education system because there was no showing that the financing
arrangement created an unconstitutionally inefficient system of education).
54. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994) (upholding Virginia's
public school financing where the state constitution recognized education as a fundamental right, but did not require equal or substantially equal funding among or within
state school divisions).
55. See Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994)
(upholding on procedural grounds the North Dakota school financing system, despite
constitutionally suspect per-pupil spending disparities).
56. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (upholding Minnesota school
financing system that contained a constitutionally permissible referendum levy statute,
that guaranteed the citizens' fundamental right to education, and that involved spending
disparities throughout the state).
57. See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (rejecting a challenge to state
funding system that failed to provide additional funds to districts with higher concentrations of impoverished students).
58.
411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, the Texas system of school finance provided
that districts received a portion of their budgets from state funds and supplemented
those funds with an ad valorem tax on property within the district. Id. at 9-10. The
plaintiffs, Mexican-American parents of children attending school in a property-poor
district, id. at 4-5, alleged that reliance on the property taxes favored the property.
wealthy districts over the property-poor districts in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see id. at 19.
59. Id. at 40. The Supreme Court found that no federal right was implicated, id.
at 35, and that no suspect class was disadvantaged by the system, id. at 28.
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interest in preserving local control of education. 60 The Court's
opinion on the applicable equal protection standard did not
change with its holding inPapasan v. Allain. 61 There, the Court
again found that the rational basis test was the correct standard. 62 The case was remanded for further factual findings to
determine whether the disparities were rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. 63
The application of the rational basis test does not, however,
guarantee that the challenged school financing formula will be
upheld; funding disparities may constitute an equal protection
violation when it can be shown that they are not rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. Nonetheless, it is very
difficult to prove that a state system is irrational. 64
The question, then, is whether the courts will continue to
accept the rationales for disparate funding levels as legitimate.
The Supreme Court has, in the past, been willing to accept local
control of public education as a legitimate state purpose. 65
Finance systems which permit disparities in funding while
ensuring a minimum :foundation program also have been seen
by courts as rationally related to the objective oflocal control. 66

60. See id. at 49-53 (discussing the merits of local control).
61.
478 U.S. 265 (1986).
62.
Id. at 284.
63.
See id. at 289. The language in Papasan could be interpreted as narrowing the
ruling in Rodriguez. The Court stated that Rodriguez did not "purport to validate all
funding variations that might result from a State's public school funding decisions." Id.
at 287 (emphasis added). The Court, however, was unable to pursue the issue further
because the district court had dismissed the claims without making the necessary factual
determination. Id. at 289.
64.
For examples of cases upholding school financing systems under rational basis
scrutiny, see Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d· 590 (Ariz. 1973); Lujan v. Colorado State
Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156
(Ga. 1981); Idaho School for Equal Education Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho
1993); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County
Board of Education, 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn.
1993); Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d
359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983); Board of Education v. Walter,
390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair School Finance
Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Ok. 1987); Reform Education Finance Inequities Today
v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991), affd as modified, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993). But see Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark.
1983) (finding a state funding scheme unconstitutional under a rational basis test where
the financing system bore no rational relationship to the educational needs of the
individual districts but rather was determined primarily by the tax base of each district).
65.
See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
66.
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411U.S.1, 49-53 (1973);
cf id. at 126 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that local control may be legitimate in
many cases but that, in the instant case, "it [was] apparent that the State's purported
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This view, however, is changing. More courts are beginning
to see the purpose of the funding formula to be the equitable
provision of education to all children in a state67 and the states'
highest courts have found specifically that disparities in funding,
in fact, may impede local control of school districts. 68 As stated
by the Tennessee Supreme Court:
First, to alter the state financing system to provide greater
equalization among districts does not in any way dictate that
local control must be reduced. Second, as pointed out in
Serrano II, "The notion oflocal control was a 'cruel illusion'
for the poor districts due to limitations placed upon them by
the system itself.... Far from being necessary to promote
local fiscal choice, the present system [of school finance that
is based on district wealth] actually deprives the less
wealthy districts of the option."69 Consequently, even without
deciding whether the right to a public education is fundamental, we can find no constitutional basis for the present
system, as it has no rational bearing on the educational
needs of the districts. 70

B. Educational Deprivation
Equal protection clauses-both state and federal-also have
been used to challenge state action which unjustifiably infringes
on an individual's rights. 71 Central to the analysis under this

concern with local control [was] offered primarily as an excuse rather than as a
justification for interdistrict inequality"); McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 156; Board of Educ.,
Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
67.
See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117-R
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices
No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 110, 114-15 (Ala. 1993).
68.
Dupree, 651 S.W.2d at93; Serranov. Priest(Serranom, 557 P.2d929, 948(Cal.
1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A2d 359, 373 (Conn.
1977) (finding that the option of local control for "a town which lacks the resources to
implement the higher quality educational program which it desires and which is
available to property-richer towns is highly illusory"); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989), amended, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
69.
Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 948.
70.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 155 (quoting Dupree, 651 S.W.2d at 93) (emphasis
omitted).
71.
See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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variation is the question of whether public school education is
a fundamental right within the framework of constitutional
rights. If so, under the traditional three-tier analysis of judicial
review, the appropriate level ofreview would be strict scrutiny, 72
which would require the state to justify its actions in the
distribution of funds to public schools by showing that such
distribution was necessary to a compelling state interest. 73
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the
United States Supreme Court held that education was not a
fundamental right under the Federal Constitution. 74 Federal
law, however, is not controlling where a state court determines
that state constitutional rights are broader than their federal
counterparts. 75 Because state courts are the best interpreters of

72.
See, e.g., Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951-52 (holding that, under the California
constitution, education is a fundamental right that requires application of strict
scrutiny); cf San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (finding
that, because education is not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution, strict
scrutiny is not required).
73.
NOWAK ET. AL, supra note 15, § 14.3, at 530.
74.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
75.
See, e.g., Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 950-51 (labelling U.S. Supreme Court
precedent persuasive where Federal Equal Protection Clause provides less protection
than the analogous provision of the California Constitution); Horton v. Meskill, 376
A.2d 359, 371 (Conn. 1977) (giving persuasive authority to the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Federal Equal Protection Clause, but "fully recogniz[ing] the
primary independent vitality of the provisions of [Connecticut's] own constitution").
But see Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974), overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). In Kinnear, the
court found that the equal protection provisions of the U.S. and Washington Constitutions "have the same significance and are to be construed alike." Id. at 198. Thus, the
court cited Rodriguez as the "direct and controlling" case in upholding the Washington
school funding and disbursement statutes. Id. at 200. However, four years later, that
decision was overruled insofar as it held that education was not a fundamental right.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
Other state courts have rejected Rodriguez because they question the existence of
fundamental rights altogether. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
stated:
[W]e have not found helpful the concept of a "fundamental" right. No one has
successfully defined the term for this purpose. Even the proposition discussed
in Rodriguez, that a right is "fundamental" ifit is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, is immediately vulnerable, for the right to acquire
and hold property is guaranteed in the Federal and State Constitutions, and
surely that right is not a likely candidate for such preferred treatment.
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J.), affirmed as modified, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), enforced, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
913 (1975). The supreme courts of Idaho and Georgia have noted with approval the
New Jersey Supreme Court's treatment of the issue of fundamental rights. See
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 166-67 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537
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their own state constitutional provisions, they are free to delve
into their history and discern the meaning of state constitutional
provisions without being bound by issues of comity to federal
courts. 76
The California Supreme Court felt compelled to treat education as a fundamental interest because of the "distinctive and
priceless function of education in our society''77 rather than due
to any particular constitutional language. The court observed
that education:. -is essential
to a free enterprise democracy; is
.
universally relevant; continues over a lengthy period of life;
molds the personality of young people; and is so important that
the state has made it compulsory. 78 The court found that education, in important ways, was at least as vital to a citizen as two
other state constitutional rights-voting and the rights of
criminal defendants. 79 The California court appears to be alone
in its adoption of this type of analysis to determine fundamentality. 80 The ambiguity of the court's language has prompted
at least one commentator to suggest that the ruling offers "little
substantive guidance to lower courts." 81
Courts also may determine that, even if education is not a
fundamental right that requires strict scrutiny, an intermediatelevel scrutiny still should be employed. A determination that,
although not a fundamental right, a public school education is
within the tier of individual interests to be afforded some protection would require the state to show that denial of an education was substantially related to some important state interest. 82
P.2d 635, 644 n.38 (Idaho 1975). The use of the Rodriguez analysis thus may have
little effect on whether state courts find education to be a fundamental right under
state law.
76.
Cf. Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 950 n.43 (citing Baker v. City ofFairbanks, 471 P.2d
386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970) (declaring that the Alaska Supreme Court has a "duty" to
explore and develop that state's own constitutional history, provided that the state court
does not contravene the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of federal
constitutional provisions)).
77.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971).
78.
Id. at 1258-59.
79.
See id. at 1257-58.
80.
See William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis ofState Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1675 (1989)
(suggesting that the California Supreme Court had adopted a "third" and novel "test
of fundamentality").
81. Id. (criticizing the California test as "open-ended" and as a potential "license
... [to] trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain") (citing Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled by, Halloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964)).
82.
For a discussion of the intermediate level of scrutiny, see NOWAK ET AL., supra
note 15, § 14.3 at 531-33.
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The state court alternatively could determine that a mid-level
analysis is applicable even if fundamentality was established.
In Plyler v. Doe 83 the United States Supreme Court considered
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to apply when children
are completely denied a public school education. In that case,
the Court found that, although education is not specifically set
forth as a federal constitutional right, it ''has a fundamental role
in maintaining the fabric of our society''84 by preparing citizens
to participate in a democracy and to lead economically productive lives. Finding that the state could not demonstrate that a
substantial interest was furthered by the statute excluding
children of illegal aliens from the Texas public school system,
the Court ruled the statute unconstitutional. 85
In a more recent North Dakota case, the state court found
that a mid-level scrutiny should be applied in a school finance
setting because it is an "important substantive right." 86 The
court stated:
Funding of education promotes "[a] high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part of every
voter in a government by the people ... to insure the continuance of that government and the prosperity and happiness
of the people" ... and is essential to the practical realization
of the fundamental right enumerated in our state constitution ....
Although the statutory method for distributing funding for
education may not totally deprive any student of access to
the fundamental right to education, we believe the method
of distributing funding for that fundamental right involves
important substantive matters similar to those rights involved in cases in which we have applied the intermediate
level of scrutiny. Accordingly, we analyze these equal protection claims under the intermediate level of scrutiny, and we
require the distribution of funding for education to bear a
close correspondence to legislative goals. 87

83.
457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
84. Id. at 221.
85. Id. at 230. It is unclear which level of scrutiny the Court adopted, but it
appeared to be higher than rational basis. See id. at 224 (stating that the statute in
question could "hardly be considered rational unless it ... further[ed] some substantial
goal of the State").
86.
Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994).
87. Id. at 259 (quoting N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1) (citations omitted). The North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld the state educational financing system for procedural
reasons. Id. at 250.
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Using a variety of analyses, courts in thirteen states have held
education to be a fundamental right under their state constitutions.88 For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that its constitutional provision89 provided to all
children the right to adequate educational services. 90 The
Massachusetts court based its holding on the terms used within
the state constitutional provision:
The duty established is, inter alia, placed on the "legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this Commonwealth." The common meaning of "duty'' in 1780, according
to a dictionary of the English language published that year,
was "that to which a man is by any natural or legal obligation bound." "[l]n the sense most obvious to the common
intelligence," both then and now, a duty that to which one
is bound, or an "obligation."91
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Claremont School
District v. Governor92 found a constitutional duty to provide

88.
See Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117-R
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices
No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 110, 157 (Ala. 1993); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist.
v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811 (Ariz. 1994); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz.
1973); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977);
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A2d 359,
373 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 214 (Ky. 1989);
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511
N.W.2d at 256; Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 151 (Tenn.
1993); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994); Pauley v. Bailey, 255
S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989);
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
89.
The relevant language of the Massachusetts Constitution is as follows:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body
of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and
as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in
the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it
shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this
commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all
seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and
grammar schools in the towns ....
MAss. CONST. pt. II, ch. 5, § 2.
90.
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548
(Mass. 1993).
91.
Id. at 524-25 (citations omitted).
92.
635 A2d 1375 (N.H. 1993).
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education from co_nstitutional language requiring the legislature
to "cherish" public schools. 93 The Tennessee Supreme Court used
a logical approach, analyzing the syntax of the constitutional
provision to determine that education was a constitutional right:
The declaration that "[k]nowledge, learning, and virtue, [are]
essential to the preservation of republican institutions,"
contained in the same provision of the constitution that
created a public school system and provided for its support
through a common school fund, established the legal right
to public education in Tennessee. 94
The Missouri court in Committee for Educational Equality v.
Missouri 95 found that the legislature had a constitutional
obligation to provide an equitable and meaningful education to
every child of the state. The court reasoned as follows:
The Constitution of Missouri requires that the State of
Missouri provide and fund a system of free public schools so
that every child in Missouri will be afforded substantially
equal educational opportunities without regard to place of
residence, wealth or other economic circumstance ....
A deviation from equality on a per student basis in the
distribution of the total resources (both state and local)
among the schools in the Missouri school system should not
be permitted except to provide resources either (a) to the
least advantaged or (b) for specially identified educational
needs. 96
Similarly, legislative involvement in education since the
framing of the state's constitution convinced the Wisconsin
Supreme Court that education was a fundamental right. 97

93.
Id. at 1377-78. The court found that the Encouragement of Literature Clause
of the New Hampshire Constitution imposes a duty on the state to provide constitutionally adequate education to every educable child in public schools in the state and
to guarantee adequate funding because the phrase "shall be the duty ... to cherish" is
not merely a statement of aspiration; rather, the language commands that the state
provide education to all its citizens and that it support all public schools. Id. at 1378.
94.
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150 (Tenn. 1993)
(quoting TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 120).
95.
No. CV190-1371CC (Cole County, Mo. Jan. 15, 1993) (on file with the University
ofMichigan Journal ofLaw Reform); Committee for Educ. Equalityv. State, 878 S.W.2d
446 (Mo. 1994).
96.
Id. at 30.
97.
See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989).
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Courts during the first and second waves of school finance
litigation focused their analyses on state and federal equal
protection claims which involve different levels of judicial
scrutiny. In the most current, third-wave cases, in which plaintiffs have used state constitutional provisions as a vehicle, both
the federal test for determining a fundamental right98 and for
when to apply strict scrutiny99 are abandoned. The level of
scrutiny is sometimes unclear in these cases. 100 It appears the
focus of litigation in this third wave has shifted away from the
three levels of scrutiny and toward the substance of a state's
education clause.

98.
See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811, 815-16
(Ariz. 1994) (holding that the school financing system did not satisfy the Arizona
"general and uniform" constitutional mandate, thus leaving undecided the issue of
whether education is a fundamental right); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v.
Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 732 (Idaho 1993) (rejecting the Rodriguez definition of fundamental
right and finding that education is not a fundamental right under the Idaho Constitution); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S. W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (holding that
the common school system was unconstitutional under the Kentucky Constitution and,
therefore, not deciding whether education is a fundamental right under the U.S.
Constitution); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511N.W.2d247, 256 (N.D. 1994)
(containing an agreement by both parties that education was a fundamental right under
the North Dakota Constitution); McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 156 (holding the school
funding scheme was unconstitutional without reaching the question of whether
·education is a fundamental right under the state constitution); Scott v. Commonwealth,
443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) (finding education to be a fundamental right under the
Virginia Constitution); Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 568 (rejecting Rodriguez in so far as it held
that education was a fundamental right but following Rodriguez by applying the rational
basis standard); Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Ill. App.
1994) (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court's definition of fundamental right differs
from the federal definition).
99.
See, e.g., Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315-16 (Minn. 1993) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to review educational funding system under the state equal
protection clause); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511 N.W.2d at 259 (applying strict
scrutiny in determining whether the legislature provided a "general and uniform" system
of education but applying rational basis in reviewing the financing of such a system).
100. See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117-R
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices
No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 110, 161 (Ala. 1993) (declaring the Alabama public school
system unconstitutional under any of the three equal protection standards of review);
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 156 (declaring the state financing arrangement unconstitutional under rational basis review without enumerating the requirements of that level
of review); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989)
(striking a school fmancing arrangement without explicitly stating the level of analysis
used), mandamus proceeding, 804 S.W.2d 491 (1991); Committee for Educ. Equality v.
Missouri, No. CV190-1371CC (Cole County, Mo. Jan. 15, 1993) (declaring the Missouri
school finance scheme unconstitutional without indicating the level of scrutiny employed)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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C. Education Clause
An education clause is a state constitutional provision containing some statement about the state's role in public education. Education clauses vary widely by state. Some states merely
pronounce the importance of education, while others mandate
a "system" of free public education. Still others qualify the term
"system" with such phrases as "thorough and efficient," "uniform," or "general and uniform." 101 Although some scholars have

101. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV,§ 256, amended by ALA. CONST. amend. 111 ("a liberal
system of public schools"); ALAsKA CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("a system of public schools"); Aruz.
CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("a general and uniform public school system"); ARK. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 1 ("a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools"); CAL. CONST. art. IX,
§ 5 ("a system of common schools"); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("a thorough and uniform
system of free public schools"); CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("free public elementary and
secondary schools"); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("a general and efficient system of free public
schools"); FLA. CONST. art. IX,§ 1 ("a uniform system of free public schools"); GA. CONST.
art. VIII,§ 1, 'll l("an adequate public education"); HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("a statewide
system of public schools"); IDAHO CONST. art. IX,§ 1 ("a general, uniform and thorough
system of public, free common schools"); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("an efficient system of
high quality pU:blic educational institutions and services"); IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("a
general and uniform system of Common Schools"); IOWA CONST. art. IX,§ 3 ("encourage,
by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural
improvement"); KAN. CONST. art. VI,§ 1 ("establishing and maintaining public schools");
KY. CONST. § 183 ("an efficient system of common schools"); LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("a
public educational system"); ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1 ("the Legislature are
authorized, and it shall be their duty to require, the several towns to make suitable
provision at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools"); MD.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools"); MAss.
CONST. pt. II, ch. V, §II ("to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all
seminaries of them; especially the University at Cambridge, public schools and grammar
schools in the towns"); MICH. CONST. art. VIII,§ 2 ("a system of free public elementary
and secondary schools"); MINN. CONST. art. XIII,§ 1 ("a general and uniform system of
public schools"); MISS. CONST. art. VIII,§ 201 ("establishment, maintenance and support
of free public schools"); Mo. CONST. art. IX, § l(a) ("establish and maintain free public
schools for gratuitous instruction"); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3) ("a basic system of free
quality public elementary and secondary schools"); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("free
instruction in the common schools"); NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2 ("a uniform system of
common schools"); N.H. CONST. pt. 2 art. 83 ("cherish the interest of literature and the
sciences, and all seminaries and public schools"); N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 'I 1 ("a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools"); N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("a
uniform system of free public schools"); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("a system of free
common schools"); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2) ("a general and uniform system of free
public schools"); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("a uniform system of free public schools");
OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("a thorough and efficient system of common schools"); OKLA.
CONST. art. XIII, § 1 ("a system of free public schools"); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("a
uniform, and general system of Common schools"); PA. CONST. art. III,§ 14 ("a thorough
and efficient system of public education"); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("promote public
schools"); S.C. CONST. art. XI,§ 3 ("a system of free public schools"); S.D. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1 ("a general and uniform system of public schools"); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12 ("a

512

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:3

attempted to categorize state education clauses according to
their language in an attempt to predict the likelihood of success
for school finance equity cases based on such clauses, 102 such
exercises are not particularly clear or useful. Education clauses,
for the most part, defy categorization because they are peculiar
to the state's constitutional history103 and its judiciary's own
method of interpretation. 104 State courts have used variously
worded educational provisions to reach similar results, 105 and

system of free public schools"); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("an efficient system of public
free schools"); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1 ("establishment and maintenance of the state's
education systems"); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68 ("a competent number of schools ought to be
maintained in each town"); VA. CONST. art. VIII,§ 1 ("a system of free public elementary
and secondary schools"); WASH. CONST. art. Ix,§ 2 ("a general and uniform system of
public schools"); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("a thorough and efficient system of free
schools"); WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 ("the establishment of district schools, which shall be
as nearly uniform as practicable"); WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("a complete and uniform
system of public instruction").
102. See, e.g., Molly McUsic, The Use ofEducation Clauses in School Finance Reform
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 319-26 (1991) (analyzing and arguing for the use
of education clauses in school finance reform litigation); William E. Thro, The Role of
Language ofthe State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 Enuc. L. REP.
19 (1993) (advocating that courts should examine constitutional history and explicit
language to interpret state education clauses).
103. For a discussion of the historical development of education clauses in state
constitutions, see William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School
Finance, 35 B.C. L. REV. 569 (1994).
104. The courts recognize the unique nature of state education clauses. For example,
the Tennessee Supreme Court observed:
[T]he decisions of the courts in [other] jurisdictions provide little guidance in
construing the reach of the education clause of the Tennessee Constitution. This
is true because the decisions by the courts of other states are necessarily controlled
in large measure by the particular wording of the constitutional provisions of those
state charters regarding education and, to a lesser extent, organization and
funding.

McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 148. New Hampshire, however, is an exception to this general
rule. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993) (examining
the New Hampshire Constitution alongside the Massachusetts Constitution because the
former was modeled on the latter).
105. Compare McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.
1993) (holding that the Massachusetts Constitution requires that the Commonwealth
provide all public school students with an adequate education) with Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (finding that the Kentucky Constitution
mandates the general assembly to provide an efficient statewide system of common
schools). The Massachusetts Constitution uses the phrase, the "duty ... to cherish the
interests of ... public schools." MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. 5, § 2. The Kentucky Constitution
uses the phrase, an "efficient system of common schools." KY. CONST.§ 183. Courts of
both states found that the respective education provisions required each state to provide
equal access to an education which affords the opportunity for a student to develop skills
necessary to participate meaningfully in society. McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 548; Council
for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d at 212-13.
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state courts have used similarly worded educational provisions
to reach different results. 106
In school finance cases across the nation, education clauses
have been used in two ways: (1) by applying the provision to
determine if the legislature is abiding by its obligation under the
clause; or (2) by using the provision to define education as a
right protected by equal protection and due process. In many
cases, both claims have been made and are basically indistinguishable. The latter arguments have been discussed above. 107
The former argument preserves the more interesting and
current questions. Here, arguments focus on the question of the
type and level of support required to be provided under the state
constitution. Thus, the focus is what would have been efficiency,
vertical equity, and adequacy. Most importantly, the focus shifts
from equal expenditures to spending required for students'
needs.

II. ADEQUACY AND VERTICAL EQUITY
A state's obligations under an education clause generally has
been interpreted as including a substantive component: the
education that the state provides must be meaningful. 108 The
focus is on providing an opportunity for students to receive an
education that will prepare them to participate actively in
society. This student-oriented focus differs substantially from
previous cases that concentrated on equal resources being expended by districts. 109
In the context of public education, this argument is actually
very old. Thomas Jefferson, in A Bill for the More General

106. Compare Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (holding that the
constitutional requirement of uniformity in education did not require full equalization
of local referendum levies) with Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d
432 (N.C. Ct. App.) (holding that the state constitution only guarantees equal access to
education and not equal educational opportunities), dismissal allcwed and review denied,
361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987). The Minnesota court found that state's educational provision
to require only an adequate level of education which meets state standards for all
students, Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 311-12, while the North Carolina court found its
provision to require equal access to education. Britt, 357 S.E.2d at 436.
107. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
108. Cf supra note 93 (requiring a state to provide adequate school funding).
109. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989)
(finding that districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil
at similar levels of tax effort), mandamus proceeding, 804 S.W.2d 491 (1991).
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Diffusion of Knowledge, 110 cited the development of citizens'

minds as the most effectual means of preventing tyranny. 111 He
argued that a democratic government works best when its
citizens and governmental officers are "rendered by liberal
education worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred
deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens, and ...
they should be called to that charge without regard to wealth,
birth or other accidental condition or circumstance ...."112 Thus,
the purpose of education, under this Jeffersonian concept, is to
prepare society's children to be functioning members of the state
when they reach the age of majority: able to read, write, work,
and be active participants in our democratic society. As stated
in Abbott v. Burke, 113 a constitutionally sufficient education
under the New Jersey Constitution is "one that will equip all of
[the] students of the state to perform their roles as citizens and
competitors in the same society." 114
Courts in Alabama, 115 Arizona, 116 California, 117 Massachusetts, 118 Missouri, 119 and Texas 120 have all found similar embodiments of this Jeffersonian principle in their state's constitutional
provisions requiring that the state provide meaningful education
to all of its children in an equitable manner. As stated by a

110. THOMAS JEFFERSON,ABill for the More General Diffusion ofKnowledge, in THE
COMPLETE JF;FFERSON 1048 (Saul K Padover ed., 1943).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 575 A2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
114. Id. at 410.
115. Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-833-R, CV-91-Dll 7-R (Ala.
Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No.
338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 110, 151-54 (Ala. 1993).
116. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 812, 816 (Ariz. 1994).
117. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59 (Cal. 1971).
118. McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 535-41
(Mass. 1993). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that a provision
of their state constitution was based on this Jeffersonian principle.
The duty is established so that the rights and liberties of the people will be
preserved. The immediate purpose of the establishment of the duty is the spreading of the opportunities and advantages of education throughout the people; the
ultimate end is the preservation ofrights and liberties. Put otherwise, an educated
people is viewed as essential to the preservation of the entire constitutional plan:
a free, sovereign, constitutional democratic State.

Id. at 524.
119. Committee for Educ. Equality v. Missouri, No. CV190-1371CC (Cole County,
Mo. Jan. 15, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
120. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 395-96 (Tex. 1989),
mandamus proceeding, 804 S.W.2d 491 (1991).
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court in Missouri, "[t]he Constitution of Missouri promotes the
Jeffersonian concept that education is fundamental to democracy
and that the state should assume the primary educational
role." 121
The highest state courts of West Virginia, 122 Kentucky, 123
Washington 124 New Jersey 125 Alabama 126 and Tennessee127 have
'
' a certain substantive
stressed that' public education
must meet
level of educational quality in order to satisfy constitutional
requirements. 128 For example, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
in interpreting that state's constitutional requirement described
the constitutional mandate to be as follows:
that the General Assembly shall maintain and support a
system of free public schools that provides, at least, the
121. Committee for Educ. Equality, No. CV 190-1371CC, slip op. at 26. The Missouri
Constitution provides:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the General Assembly shall establish
and maintain free public schools ....

Id. (quoting Mo. CONST. art. IX," § l(a)). The court further stated:
By reason of Article IX, Section l(a), the State of Missouri is required to
maintain a system of free public schools which will provide for that "general
diffusion of knowledge and intelligence" which is necessary in any given era to
preserve the "rights and liberties of the people." It is not sufficient that a system
be only "establish[ed]", it is constitutionally essential, as well, that it be "maintain[ed]" at an ever evolving level which will assure the "preservation of the rights
and liberties of the people. n

Id.
122. Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979).
123. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1989).
124. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978).
125. Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 580 (N.J. 1994); Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376,
388 (N.J. 1985). The New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359,
368--{i9 (N.J. 1990), found that constitutional language required a "thorough and
efficient" educational system offering substantive education opportunities that will afford
each student a chance to become "a citizen and ... a competitor in the labor market."
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J.), affirmed as modified, 306 A.2d
65 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), enforced, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 913 (1975)).
126. Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-833-R, CV-91-Dll 7-R (Ala.
Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No.
338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 110, 165-66 (Ala. 1993).
127. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851S.W.2d139, 151-52 (Tenn. 1993)
(finding that the Tennessee Constitution guarantees children a certain level of education
but leaving undecided the precise level required).
128. As stated by Justice Loiselle of Connecticut, "(a] town may not herd children
in [sic] an open field to hear lectures by illiterates." Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,
379 (Conn. 1977).
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opportunity to acquire general knowledge, develop the powers of reasoning and judgment, and generally prepare
students intellectually for a mature life. 129
In New Jersey, the supreme court found that constitutional
language required a "thorough and efficient" educational system 130 offering substantive educational opportunities that will
afford each student a chance to become "a citizen and . . . a
competitor in the labor market." 131
The highest courts of Kentucky and Massachusetts went so
far as to define an adequate system specifically as one in which
a student has the opportunity to develop at least the seven
following capabilities: 132
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization;
sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices;
sufficient understanding of governmental processes to
enable the student to understand the issues that affect his
or her community, state, and nation;
sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her
mental and physical wellness;
sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage;
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training
in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each
child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable
public school students to compete favorably with their
counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the
job market. 133

More recent cases no longer focus on the simple equality of
per-pupil expenditure. These cases suggest that, as education
theory has developed, society has become more aware that not

129. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 150-51.
130. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A2d 359, 368-69 (N.J. 1990).
131. Id.
132. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989); see also
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993)
(defining educational adequacy with respect to the seven similar criteria and citing the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Council for Better Education).
133. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d at 212.
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all children are equal in terms of their task of learning. They
have differing abilities and challenges. The system has shifted
its focus in an attempt to meet the individual needs of children.
There has been a shift from the paradigm of "one size fits all"
curriculum to individualized learning in an attempt to accommodate the needs of diverse learners. Differences in per-pupil
expenditures are judged by student needs. As stated by the
Arizona Supreme Court: "We emphasize that a general and
uniform school system does not require perfect equality or
identity. For example, a system that acknowledges special needs
would not run afoul of the uniformity clause." 134 Disparities or
differences in the educational services provided to a student are
thus being assessed on the grounds of educational needs as
opposed to district wealth.
As early as 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that
the New Jersey Constitution required an educational system
which provided economically disadvantaged students with the
opportunity to compete effectively with students from wealthy
districts. 135 The court recognized that the needs of students from
poor districts required the state to spend even more money than
it spent on students from wealthy districts in an effort to equalize the resources offered to students in the disparate districts. 136
Children who have greater educational needs should receive
greater educational services. 137 It is not logical that children who

134. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 816 (Ariz. 1994).
135. See Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 390 (N.J. 1985) (comparing "the education
received by children in property-poor districts to that offered in property-rich districts"
to ensure that the disadvantaged children can "compete in, and contribute to, the society
entered by the relatively advantaged children").
136. See id. at 388.
137. Scholars remain divided over whether dollars can rectify inadequate education.
Compare Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy,
28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 454 (1991) ("If schools are ineffective at [translating resources into student achievement], simply heaping more resources on poorly performing
districts will do little to improve educational equity.") with G. Alfred Hess, Jr.,
METROSTAT, Chicago Panel on Public School Policy and Finance, MONEY MAKES A
DIFFERENCE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF MIDWESTERN CITY SCHOOL EXPENDITURE~T.
LoUIS AND CHICAGO 2 (1993) and William T. Hartman, District Spending Disparities:
What Do Dollars Buy?, 13 J. EDUC. FIN. 436, 458-59 (1988) (concluding that districts
with more available funds spend them on resources believed to enhance the quality of
education) and JOHN E. COONS ET AL., supra note 23, at 30 (arguing that cost is related
to quality). Coons, Clune, and Sugarman have stated:
We regard the fierce resistance by rich districts to reform as adequate testimonial
to the relevance of money. Whatever it is that money may be thought to contribute
to the education of children, that commodity is something highly prized by those
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have fewer educational needs should receive greater educational
services merely because of the fact that they reside in a district
with great property wealth. The problem is further compounded
when one considers that children in need of high-cost programs
are typically clustered in property-poor districts. 138 These are
students in need of compensatory education, 139 bilingual programs, and special education. 140
Arguments for compensatory funding of poor districts often are
stated in terms of fulfilling the state's constitutional obligation
or in terms of defining the rationality of educational funding.
The state has a legitimate interest in providing an adequate and
equitable education to all of the children of the state. It does not
have any legitimate interest in depriving them of such an education. Courts considering systems in which those with the
greatest educational needs receive the least money have generally found such systems to be irrational and insufficient under
state education clauses.
It is up to each state court to devise a definition of adequacy
by which to measure the legislature's efforts in the area of

who enjoy the greatest measure of it. If money is inadequate to improve education,
the residents of poor districts should at least have an equal opportunity to be
disappointed by its failure.

Id.
138. See, e.g., WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BuREAu, AN EvALUATION OF THE CHAPrER
220 PROGRAM 38 ( 1994) (showing that children in Milwauke~. especially minorities, have
poorer reading skills than their suburban counterparts).
139. In the evaluation of the desegregation program for Milwaukee Public Schools
and the surrounding suburbs, nearly twice as many students were found to be in need
of compensatory education in property-poor Milwaukee in comparison to the propertywealthy suburban districts. For example, on the statewide tenth grade reading test, only
35.5% of Milwaukee students scored above the national 50th percentile compared to
72. 7% of suburban students scoring above the national 50th percentile. Id.
140. The situation is compounded by funding considerations. Under the Individual
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), federal funds
have never exceeded 12.5% of the national average per pupil expenditure. Thomas B.
Parrish & Deborah A. Verstegen, The Current Federal Role in Special Education
Funding, 22 EDUC. CONSIDERATIONS 36, 36 (1994). From 1982 to 1988, the cost of special
education programs borne by local school districts ranged from 36.1% to 37.8%. U.S.
DEPT OF EDUC., To Assum: THE FREE AND APPRoPRTATE PuBLIC EDUCATION OF AIL CHILDREN
WTIH DlsABILmES: FoURl'EEN'IH ANNuAL REl'oRI' 'IO CoNGRESS ON 'lHE IMPIEMENrATION OF 'lHE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 146 (1992). The financial impact of this
funding imbalance is troublesome, particularly for poor districts, due to cost and
incidence rate. For example, in Wisconsin, the incidence of special education students
is significantly higher in the 20 poorest school districts in terms of property wealth as
compared to the 20 wealthiest districts. Julie K. Underwood et al., Feasibility Study for
the Association for Equity in Funding: Wisconsin School Finance Equity Final Report
(Aug. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
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education. The trend is to find that the constitutional provision
requires, at a minimum, a meaningful education which provides
each student with the opportunity to develop and become a
productive citizen. The language of state constitutions indicates
that to fulfill the purpose of the constitutional mandate, students should have an opportunity within the puolic school
system to develop the skills necessary to become meaningful
contributors to our economy and democratic process.
This approach still does not address the problem that these
remedies and theories still focus on educational inputs rather
than on desired educational outcomes. However, this trend too
may be changing. 141 In the area of school desegregation, recent
cases involving the question of achieving unitary status have
inquired into actual student performance as a criterion rather
than the mere percentage of minority members in the population
of students and teachers. 142 It has been argued that certain
types of judicial remedies .in the area of desegregation have
effected actual school reform because they have altered the
political power groups involved. 143 This outcome theory may lay
the seeds of the fourth wave of school finance reform litigation.

141. For a related discussion, see John Dayton, Correlating Expenditures and
Educational Opportunity in School Funding Litigation: The Judicial Perspective, 19 J.
EDUC. FIN. 167, 171-82 (1993).
.
142. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 38 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 1994).
143. See, e.g., Jomills H. Braddock II et al., A Long-Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of Graduates as Adults, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 259 (1984)
(arguing that school desegregation results in societal desegregation); James S. Liebman,
Desegregating Politics: "All-Out» School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463
(1990) (arguing that school desegregation will solve the problem of systemic racism in
the United States).

